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MANDATORY DISCLOSURE is an important regulatory tool intended to allow market 
participants to assess manager risks without unnecessarily constraining manager actions. 
This trade-off between transparency and freedom of activity is particularly relevant for 
hedge funds, which often rely on proprietary models and positions.1 In the ongoing 
dialogue over the pros and cons of hedge fund activity, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in particular has tried to walk a fine line between allowing the 
invisible hand of the market to establish the level and type of disclosure demanded of 
investment managers, while at the same time seeking to require a minimum framework of 
transparency with respect to operational risk.  
 A recent failed attempt to bring hedge funds within the purview of SEC regulation 
affords an opportunity to test whether mandated disclosure—at least for one sector of the 
investment industry—has value as a public good or is simply costly and redundant. In 
this paper we test the potential value and materiality of operational risk and conflict of 
interest variables disclosed by a large number of hedge funds in February 2006. We find 
that operational risk indicators are conditionally correlated with conflict of interest 
variables, indicating a potential value of disclosing such conflicts to investors. 
Operational risk factors are also correlated with lower leverage and concentrated 
ownership, suggesting that the 2006 disclosure requirements may have been redundant 
for lenders and equity investors in hedge funds. In contrast, operational risk factors had 
no ex-post effect on the flow-performance relationship, suggesting that investors either 
lack this information or do not regard it as material.  
 2
 The results of our analysis provide a framework for the cost-benefit analysis of 
regulatory disclosure. Our findings suggest that any consideration of disclosure 
requirements should take into account the endogenous production of information within 
the industry, and the marginal benefit of required disclosure on different investment 
clienteles. 
On December 2, 2004, the SEC adopted a new rule and rule amendments under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 that would require hedge fund managers to register 
as investment advisers by February 1, 2006. Prior to the new requirements, only a small 
number of managers, generally of large hedge funds, were required to be registered as 
investment advisers with the SEC. To comply with the new requirements, hedge fund 
managers were required to file Form ADV with the SEC and to comply with a variety of 
additional regulatory requirements. Form ADV is a regulatory filing that is required of all 
types of fund managers, including hedge fund managers, mutual fund managers, and 
separate account managers, that fall under the definition of "investment adviser" in the 
Investment Advisers Act. However, on June 23, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the rule changes that had required many newly 
registered hedge fund managers to register as investment advisers under the Investment 
Advisers Act. Since the rule changes were vacated, far fewer hedge fund managers have 
been required to register as investment advisors.  
 As a result, the February 2006 ADV filings by a large number of hedge fund 
managers present a rare opportunity to examine the fundamental question of whether 
such disclosure is necessary or warranted. Prior to February 2006, some hedge fund 
managers, particularly managers of large funds, had been registered. The February 2006 
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filings, however, made a much larger and less biased sample available. The Form ADVs 
for this larger sample contain a wealth of information, previously unavailable for many 
managers, about fund characteristics such as potential conflicts of interest and past legal 
and regulatory problems. Both of these relate directly to the stated purpose of the 
disclosure, which includes “deterrence of fraud,” “keeping unfit persons from using 
hedge funds to perpetrate fraud,” “adoption of compliance controls,” or more generally, 
the avoidance of operational risk.2  
 By relating the Form ADV disclosures to fund characteristics, we are able to 
obtain a quantifiable measure of operational risk that is distinct from market risk. We can 
then examine whether in fact the Form ADV filing requirement provides material 
information to investors seeking to mitigate this measure of operational risk. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the marketplace has already effectively disseminated this 
information through other means, ranging from networks of informal contacts to fee-
based due-diligence research services to investments in funds of hedge fund 
intermediaries that perform the due diligence on the investor’s behalf. In other words, we 
can ask: are Form ADV filings simply redundant and expensive, or do they provide 
valuable, otherwise inaccessible information to participants in the market for hedge fund 
services, thereby helping them avoid investing in potentially fraudulent firms? 
This analysis provides interesting insight into the mechanics of the information 
disclosure hypothesis, which suggests that the market in other contexts rewards those 
firms that voluntarily submit to SEC disclosure requirements.3 Consistent with this 
argument, we find evidence that the information in the form has the potential to add value 
to the investor decision-making process. Hedge funds operated by managers filing Form 
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ADV in 2006 had better past performance and had more assets than those operated by 
managers who did not file either because they were technically exempt from the filing 
requirement, or because they simply chose not to file. This result suggests that filing 
alone may be a potential signal of quality.4 In addition, we find a strong positive 
association between potential conflicts identified in the Form ADV filing and past legal 
and regulatory problems. Finally, through a canonical correlation analysis, we are able to 
establish a link between potential conflicts identified in Form ADV filings and 
operational risk characteristics in the Lipper TASS, Inc. (TASS) database. This allows us 
to establish a time series of operational risk for each fund in that database. 
To examine whether Form ADV disclosure provides material information for 
investors concerned about operational risk, we use both hedge fund capital structure and 
the time series of investment flows. We hypothesize that equity and debt investors in 
hedge funds are able to distinguish among funds with differing potential for operational 
risk given the pre-ADV information available from research services and available 
databases. Consistent with this theory, we find that funds with past legal and regulatory 
problems have a more concentrated management structure and less average leverage than 
their “nonproblem” counterparts. This suggests that some market participants, such as 
equity fund investors and prime brokers extending credit, are able to distinguish problem 
from nonproblem funds. 
We next test the proposition that the fund investors themselves are able to 
distinguish problem from nonproblem funds. To do so, we use the well-known flow-
performance relationship. All things being equal, the information redundancy hypothesis 
implies that problem funds with good performance should experience lower net inflows 
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than nonproblem funds with good performance. We find no evidence that this is so. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the evidence relating to the information 
disclosure hypothesis is mixed. Financial institutions and well-informed investors may 
already have the information contained in the Form ADV filing through the normal 
process of due diligence. Individual investors, however, may not have access to this 
information. This supports the argument that hedge fund disclosure may help level the 
informational playing field. On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
these investors have access to this information and choose not to act on it. The bottom 
line is that mandatory disclosure of operational risk factors has the potential to benefit 
smaller investors, but, to the extent it shifts the due diligence costs (and compliance risk) 
from the existing information providers to the hedge funds themselves, it may or may not 
benefit larger investors. 
Although the role of regulation in the investment industry is our primary focus, 
the empirical analysis also yields other interesting results. The premise of mandated 
information disclosure is that it helps to mitigate the fundamental problem of agency. We 
find evidence that agency issues are potentially important determinants of hedge fund 
performance and hedge fund capital structure. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the ADV filing 
and reviews literature on operational risk. Section II describes the data from the SEC and 
TASS. Section III presents the testing hypothesis and the empirical results. Finally, 
Section IV concludes with a summary of our major findings. 
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I. Form ADV, Operational Risk, and Related Research 
The 2004 SEC investment adviser rule amendments referred to above required, 
among other things, that any hedge fund manager based in the United States with more 
than 14 clients, assets of at least $25 million, and a lockup period of less than two years,5 
as well as any internationally based fund with at least 14 U.S.-based investors, file Form 
ADVwith the SEC6. Form ADV is the same form used by all investment advisers. It 
contains information about potential conflicts of interest, both internal and external, any 
past regulatory or legal problems of both the hedge fund management company and any 
of its related advisors, and a wealth of specific ownership data. Prior to the 2004 rule 
changes, a smaller set of managers, mostly large hedge funds, were required to be 
registered as investment advisers with the SEC.7 These rule changes were strongly 
opposed by hedge fund managers, who argued that completing the 35-page form was 
unnecessarily costly and burdensome.8 
Although onerous, Form ADV requests information that is potentially highly 
relevant to assessing the operational risk of the investment manager. The International 
Association of Financial Engineers defines operational risk as “losses caused by 
problems with people, processes, technology, or external events.”9 More specifically, 
these include the risks of failure of the internal operational, control, and accounting 
systems, failure of the compliance and internal audit systems, and failure of personnel 
oversight systems, that is, employee fraud and misconduct. For example, losses due to 
rogue traders (e.g., Barings, National Australia Bank, Allied Irish Bank, and Société 
Générale10) and failures due to management fraud (e.g., Enron) and reputational injury 
such as the 2004 mutual fund timing scandal (e.g., Putnam) can all be thought of as 
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operational risk events. These are distinct from market risk events such as Long Term 
Capital Management’s failure due to credit exposure. Market risks are presumably 
measurable using quantitative risk models while operational risk has no direct numerical 
proxy. The challenge is to quantify this factor. Practitioner studies reveal that half of all 
hedge fund failures occur through operational risk events rather than taking excessive 
market risk (and losing).11 
 Operational risk assessment often relies upon intangible variables. Assessing 
personnel risk is perhaps the most difficult. Historical behavior and current opportunity 
are both potentially important inputs that enter into this assessment. Past manager 
behavior may include previous fiduciary decisions, as well as previous legal and 
regulatory actions taken against the manager, and any other variable that might be 
correlated with the propensity to make future illegal or unethical decisions in favor of 
one’s own interests at the expense of a client, partner, or lender. While such tendencies 
are, of course, partly manageable within an organization through internal control and 
external compliance procedures, the risk of individual fraud is likely to increase with 
opportunity. In particular, as potential conflicts of interests between manager and investor 
increase, operational risk increases as well, holding control and compliance constant. 
Thus, although the questions in Form ADV might seem unduly personal and burdensome 
to some, they reflect the fact that measurement and assessment of operational risk, 
particularly risk centered on human intent and tendencies to act unethically or illegally, is 
difficult.12 In particular, Form ADV requires disclosure of past criminal charges against 
management personnel, including the nature, severity, and disposition of past charges. It 
also requires disclosure of past regulatory actions taken against the firm or its personnel, 
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including the regulatory body and the nature of the sanction. It also requires disclosure of 
past civil judicial action, past bond action, and past arbitration relating to the firm. While 
none of these variables in isolation captures personnel-related operational risk, together 
they presumably provide evidence of past adverse behavior by the firm or by those the 
firm currently employs. 
Another key set of variables we study in this paper helps to address conflicts of 
interest. This issue has been the subject of considerable research in the setting of 
investment banking. Dugar and Nathan (1995) and Michaely and Womack (1999), 
among others, have examined how investment banking conflicts affect stock analyst 
recommendations. They find that analysts’ clients are more likely to receive positive 
coverage. In contrast, Lin and McNichols (1998) find no difference between analysts’ 
recommendations when comparing client and non-client groups. Gompers and Lerner 
(1999) find little evidence of conflict of interest in the venture capital industry; the 
investment bank’s affiliation to the public offering has no negative impact on the initial 
offering’s performance. 
A number of variables relating to potential conflicts of interest are required by 
Form ADV. In particular, the form asks whether any employee or entity controlled by the 
firm is affiliated with another type of financial institution such as a broker-dealer, mutual 
fund, or limited partnership. It asks about participation in clients’ transactions, including 
proprietary interest in transactions, sales interest in transactions, brokerage discretion, 
and custody of client assets. In each of these cases, the potential exists for the manager to 
influence client decisions, or make decisions on the client’s behalf that benefit the 
manager at the expense of the client. 
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Another set of variables we examine in this paper relates to the ownership and 
governance structure of the hedge fund. Most of the current research on this relationship 
focuses on the mutual fund industry, where such information is readily accessible. 
Cremers (2006) find that mutual funds with high director share ownership perform better. 
Ding and Wermers (2006) find that the ratio of independent directors on mutual fund 
boards predicts out-of-sample performance. Khorana and Servaes (2007) find that out-of-
sample performance is correlated with managerial ownership. Although there is 
widespread belief in the hedge fund industry that the size of the managerial stake in the 
fund is a potential proxy for good governance, such information is not generally available 
from hedge fund information vendors and no academic study to our knowledge has been 
able to empirically examine this issue. Form ADV requires detailed information both 
about direct ownership of the firm and indirect ownership of the firm. 
 
II. Data 
We obtain data for this study from two sources. The first is the TASS database. 
We use the February 2006 TASS data to match management companies with the SEC 
Form ADV filings. The TASS database contains information on 4,019 live hedge funds 
and 2,491 defunct hedge funds, along with their management companies. Data on 
individual hedge funds include their returns, assets (in most cases), lockup period, 
subscription and redemption periods, indication of a high water mark, and other 
characteristic data. TASS files also include the management company name and address. 
In addition to the February 2006 TASS data set, we also use eight previous TASS data 
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sets. These nine data sets together cover the 1998 to 2006 period, and allow us to capture 
changes in fund characteristic data over time. 
The second major source of data is the SEC investment adviser website.13 Each 
Form ADV contains information on an investment adviser. The filing consists of 12 items 
and also includes at least three schedules.14 Items 1 through 6 contain descriptive 
information on the firm, including its address, structure, number of employees in various 
positions, and a breakdown of investor types. Items 7 and 8 look at potential conflicts of 
interest of the firm. Item 9 examines the custody of various assets while Item 10 looks at 
the control persons of the firm. Item 12 provides information to allow the SEC to 
examine the effect of the regulation on small businesses.  
Item 11 is of particular interest as it identifies any “problems” its management or 
related advisory affiliates have, including felonies, investment-related misdemeanors, or 
Federal or state agency, SEC, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), or self-
regulatory issues. If the firm answers yes to any of the questions on Item 11, it must also 
file a Disclosure Reporting Page (DRP), which expands on the problem identified in Item 
11.15 Schedule A includes the direct owners and executive officers of the firm, Schedule 
B lists the indirect owners of the firm, and Schedule D includes a list of other business 
locations, other locations of record, previously nonlisted control persons, and the limited 
partnerships in which the firm participates. 
Form ADV data are downloaded directly from the SEC website and imported 
automatically into a useable data set.16 To identify Form ADVs belonging to hedge fund 
companies, a two-phase search is implemented. Using the management company 
information in TASS, we first search for the management company listed for each fund.17 
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If that search is unsuccessful, we then search for any unique names that appear in the 
fund’s name. In a majority of cases, the company is identified using just the management 
company information.18 Note that since the requirement to register began on February 1, 
2006, our searches only encompass the live database. To ensure matches, one fund listed 
in the TASS data set had to be matched to a fund listed on Form ADV.19 
We identify 879 management companies out of 1,697 listed in TASS, or 51.8% of 
the TASS database. These management companies represent 2,299 (57.2%) of the 4,019 
live funds in the live TASS database. The unmatched TASS funds include funds with less 
than the $25 million in assets (22% of unmatched funds), funds with lockups longer than 
two years (2%), and foreign companies with fewer than 14 U.S. investors (73%).20 
   <Insert Table I about here> 
Table I provides descriptive statistics for both the matched and live TASS 
databases as well as their differences. While the returns and standard deviations of the 
matched data set differ slightly, the Sharpe ratios of registered funds are significantly 
higher than those of the overall TASS data set. Skewness and kurtosis are also 
insignificantly different; however, the autocorrelation of matched funds is significantly 
higher, perhaps indicating more illiquid portfolios.21 The average size of the matched 
funds, as well as the average minimum investment amount, is also not significantly 
different between the matched and total TASS samples. Differences in high water mark 
and fees suggest that filing funds may be of higher quality than nonfiling funds. 
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III. Tests and Results 
A. Defining “Problem” Funds 
 In order to examine the relationship between conflict of interest variables and 
legal and regulatory problems, we first need to classify funds into “problem” and 
“nonproblem” categories. These are reported in Table II. 
    <Insert Table II about here> 
Problem funds are those whose management companies answered yes to any of 
the questions on Item 11 in Form ADV, while nonproblem funds answered no to all 
questions on Item 11. Problems covered on Item 11 of Form ADV include any past 
felony or financial-related misdemeanor charges or convictions. The form also includes 
questions concerning any SEC, CFTC, federal or state agency, or other regulatory 
disciplinary action as well as civil lawsuits. Of the 2,299 funds in our sample, 368 have 
management firms that answered yes to at least one question on Item 11, or 
approximately 16.0% of our sample.22 The percentage of funds with problems is not 
being driven by only a few management companies; of the 879 management companies, 
126, or 14.3%, answered affirmatively to a question on Item 11. 
 This incidence rate may seem high, but it is actually comparable to the entire 
ADV sample. Using all Form ADV data from the SEC website compiled by a third party 
company, we are able to determine the problem rate for the entire Form ADV universe.23 
Out of 10,295 ADV registrations, 1,526 indicated some type of problem. This 
represents14.8% of all Form ADVs, which is almost identical to the 14.3% of our hedge 
fund sample. This sheds a potentially useful perspective on the relative operational risks 
in the hedge fund industry compared to the larger investment management universe. In 
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particular, this finding supports the contention by the hedge fund industry that its 
operational problems are no greater than those in other investment management 
businesses.24 
Panel A of Table II examines the performance differences and fund characteristics 
between problem and nonproblem funds. There is no significant difference in terms of 
standard deviation or autocorrelation of returns; however, the mean return, Sharpe ratio, 
and appraisal ratio are significantly lower for funds with problems. 25, 26 Panel B focuses 
on external relationships that represent potential conflicts of interest.27 It reports the 
frequencies for questions such as whether the manager has a related broker/dealer, 
investment company, investment adviser commodities broker, bank or insurance 
company, or whether the manager is the sponsor of an LLP. The frequency with which 
problem funds answered yes to these questions is universally higher than for nonproblem 
funds. For example, while 73.9% of problem funds have a related Investment Adviser, 
only 41.6% of nonproblem funds have the same issue. A similar dispersion exists with 
respect to whether the firm has a related investment company—50.3% versus 15.8% for 
problem and nonproblem funds, respectively. Note that all differences are significant at 
the 1% level. 
Panel C focuses on internal potential conflicts of interest. The variable 
AgencyCrossTrans for example, asks whether a broker-dealer buys and sells broker 
clients’ securities to advisory clients.28 Only 2.3% of nonproblem funds have this 
potential conflict of interest while over 30% of problem funds do. Recommending 
securities to clients in which a related party has some ownership interest 
(RecSecYouOwn) also has a large difference, with 25% more problem funds exhibiting 
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this conflict. As in Panel B, all of the differences between problem and nonproblem funds 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The striking result of Panels B and C is the 
strong relationship between legal and regulatory problems and various measures of 
internal and external conflicts of interest. Another conflict variable, OtherResearch, 
represents services obtained from a broker-dealer that the fund uses for its transactions. It 
is strongly significant, and suggests that the potential for conflicts of interest can lead to 
operational risk events, as measured by legal and regulatory problems. This may be due 
to an actual higher incidence of fraudulent activity by managers of problem funds, or 
alternatively, it could be due to the fact that the simple presence of apparent conflicts of 
interest attracts more regulatory scrutiny and litigation. 
Panel D examines the ownership and capital structure differences between the two 
groups. Problem funds have a higher number of direct and controlling owners.29 
Interestingly, the number of direct owners in the form of non-individual domestic entities 
(DirectDomestic) is higher for problem funds than it is for nonproblem funds. This 
implies that problem firms are more likely to be structured as a venture or partnership 
with another institution. It also has the effect of allowing owners to hide their names from 
the ownership list, although it does not exempt them from reporting. Finally, the 75% 
ownership variable, which is the percentage of owners who own 75% of the company, is 
larger for problem funds. Theoretical results suggest that fear of expropriation—one 
source of operational risk—will make the management more concentrated rather than less 
concentrated.30 These results are confirmed in our data.  
Panel D also provides information about the debt of the firm. It is well established 
that external financing is more problematic where agency costs are extreme. Indeed, 
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Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) argue that external debt has an important role to play as a 
governance mechanism in such circumstances. It is therefore not surprising to find that 
problem firms have lower leverage and less margin than nonproblem firms. We 
investigate this relationship in more detail below. 
Given that an affirmative answer on Item 11 could reflect anything from 
involvement in a civil suit to conviction of a felony, it is useful to examine whether the 
type of offense makes a difference. Are the differences between problem and nonproblem 
funds driven by one specific type of violation? To address this question, we classify the 
responses on Item 11 into four groups. Group 1 includes managers who responded 
affirmatively to being charged or convicted of a felony or a finance-related misdemeanor. 
Group 2 includes managers who have had their rights to trade revoked at some time in the 
past. Group 3 includes managers with some form of regulatory violation, including a 
falsification or fabrication. Group 4 includes managers involved in a civil suit. These 
classifications are non-exclusionary; one manager may show up in all four categories. For 
the sake of brevity, the results of this analysis are not presented in table form; however, 
they clearly indicate that the differences between problem and nonproblem funds are not 
driven by a single category of violation.31 
<Insert Table III about here> 
 The frequency of association between affirmative responses to Item 11 on Form 
ADV and affirmative responses to potential conflicts is interesting, but this correlation is 
not a direct test of the determinants of problem versus nonproblem funds. For example, 
one important issue in Table II is that the differences between problem and non-problem 
funds may be driven by differences in style or fund type. For instance, perhaps funds-of-
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funds attract more regulatory scrutiny, or have a different capital structure simply 
because their business is different than that of direct managers. Table III reports the 
results of a probit estimation with the dependent variable being one if the fund is a 
problem fund and zero if the fund is a nonproblem fund. All models in the estimation 
include style dummies (unreported) to control for style differences. Model 1 includes 
only the manager and fund characteristic variables. Size is not significant, but the lack of 
a high water mark and lower incentive fees are related to a fund having a problem. The 
association between past problems and lower incentive fees is interesting in the context 
of the redundancy hypothesis because it might indicate that the market rationally 
incorporates the information about the fund’s past problems and requires compensation 
for future operational risk in the form of lower fees. This relationship is not driven by the 
fact that funds-of-funds have lower fees. One of the style categories used for control 
purposes in the probit is the fund-of-fund classification. 
 Model 2 adds the first operational risk variable. The relationship variable is one if 
the fund has one of the external relationship conflicts of interest listed in Table II, and 
zero otherwise. The variable RecSecYouOwn is one if the fund recommends securities in 
which a related party has an ownership interest, BuySellYourOwn is one if the company 
buys and sells between itself and clients, and OtherResearch is one if the fund uses 
external research from the same broker that executes its trades. The coefficients on all of 
these variables are large, positive, and statistically significant, indicating a positive 
relationship between potential conflicts of interest and legal or regulatory problems. 
Model 3 adds two ownership variables to the model and exchanges the 
AgencyCrossTrans variable for the BuySellYourOwn variable, where AgencyCrossTrans 
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is one if the fund buys and sells broker clients’ securities to advisory clients. These two 
variables are highly correlated, and unreported results indicate that the 
AgencyCrossTrans variable dominates the BuySellYourOwn variable. The 75% 
ownership variable is the percentage of direct owners who own at least 75% of the 
company. If there is only one owner, the percentage is 100%, versus 0% for a company 
with no large owner. The DirectDomestic variable is the number of domestic entities 
listed as direct owners. 
The AgencyCrossTrans variable is highly significant and positive, which again 
indicates internal conflicts of interest are related to fund problems. The two ownership 
variables are also positive and significant. Funds with concentrated management are more 
likely to be problem funds, and funds with more domestic corporations listed as owners 
are more likely to be problem funds. In the context of the redundancy hypothesis, this 
suggests that it may be difficult to find large equity partners to take a significant stake if 
you have a checkered legal and regulatory past.32 This finding may be useful in future 
studies of ownership structure and investment performance, because it implies that the 
capital structure of investment partnerships is likely to be endogenously determined, not 
only by the technology it employs and the markets in which it trades, but also by the 
exposure of the firm to operational risk. 
One might ask whether the results in the table are affected by survival bias. 
Previous literature documents a significant failure rate and survivorship bias in hedge 
fund returns (see Fung and Hsieh (2000, 2002) and Liang (2000)). Because the filing 
requirement for Form ADV and our data from TASS are from the same period of time, 
only live funds filed ADVs. To overcome this limitation, we supplement our original data 
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set with the TASS data set from February 2005 in the hope that some funds filed early or 
voluntarily. We examine which funds from the Live database in February 2005 moved to 
the Defunct database from our February 2006 data set. After excluding funds with no 
management information in either data set, we find 126 funds died at some point during 
that year. While the sample size is small with only 46 matched funds from TASS (8 
problem and 38 nonproblem), and significance levels are thus lower, the results for this 
select sample of defunct funds are substantially the same as for the broader sample.33  
For robustness, we also perform the same tests on other subsamples. We estimate 
the probit on each of the four subcategories of problems identified above. These give 
weaker but quantitatively similar results. We remove managers with a large number of 
funds to verify that the results are not driven by a few large managers. They are not. We 
also remove managers with affiliated mutual fund companies to see if this has an impact 
on the results. For this sample, most of the documented relationships between conflicts 
and problems in Table III are quantitatively unaffected, although the differences in 
ownership structure are attenuated, as expected. 
 
B. Leverage and Operational Risk 
 One test of the redundancy hypothesis is whether financial institutions such as 
prime brokers are able to distinguish between funds with higher and lower operational 
risk. To examine this, we explore differences in the leverage of problem and nonproblem 
funds. In Table II, we note a significantly different frequency in the reported use of 
leverage by problem and nonproblem funds. This zero-one variable does not take into 
account the degree of leverage, however, nor does it control for fund style. Given the 
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wide disparity in the market risk of different hedge fund styles, this control is crucial. In 
particular, funds-of-funds are less likely to employ leverage, and more likely to be 
problem funds. 
<Insert Table IV about here> 
Table IV examines the difference in three leverage measures for problem and 
nonproblem funds. The first, Leveraged, uses a zero-one variable reported by TASS as 
the measure of leverage. The second, Avg. Leverage, is the average fund leverage 
reported by TASS. The third, Maximum Leverage, is the maximum leverage of the fund 
reported by TASS. The test is applied to all funds in the matched sample, then to a subset 
that excludes funds-of-funds, and finally to a set for which the top 5% in terms of 
leverage are winsorized. Notice that the difference in the zero-one leverage variable is 
largely explained by funds-of-funds. Once these are excluded from the analysis, the 
leveraged variable is insignificant, but differences in average leverage and maximum 
leverage are both significant at traditional confidence levels. Winsorizing at the 5% level 
of leverage shows that the significance is not driven by outliers.34 
Table V shows how leverage differs by fund style. The consistency of the 
differences in average leverage across different fund styles is striking. Only one category 
(equity market neutral) has significantly higher average leverage for problem funds than 
for nonproblem funds. In all other categories except for global macro (with less than 1% 
of the problem cases) the average leverage of problem funds is lower. 
<Insert Table V about here> 
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C. Performance and Operational Risk 
 Up to this point, we document strong cross-sectional relationships among 
variables disclosed in Form ADV by hedge funds, and model the likelihood of legal and 
regulatory problems as a function of incentives, conflict of interest variables, and 
ownership structure. These analyses tell us little, however, about the actual returns to 
investment. 
Table VI reports the result of a regression in which the fund’s appraisal ratio is 
the dependent variable, and the set of explanatory variables includes those identified in 
the probit as determinants of legal or regulatory problems. As with the probit model, style 
dummies are included to control for style differences. As described earlier, appraisal 
ratios are computed using the funds’ TASS style index returns, and the top and bottom 
1% of appraisal ratios are winsorized to control for outliers. Clustered standard errors are 
used to correct for within-management company return correlation.35 Variables that have 
been previously found to be related to returns are also used for control purposes; fund 
size (LogAssets), the standard deviation of fund returns (StdDev), and Onshore (one if the 
fund is based in the U.S., and zero otherwise) are used as controls and a base 
specification in Model 1. Fund performance is positively related to all of these variables. 
Model 2 adds management and fund quality variables as well as the relationship 
variable.36  
    <Insert Table VI about here> 
 We see that the relationship variable, which is indicative of a potential external 
conflict of interest, is negative but insignificant. The last model adds ownership variables 
while continuing to use the same set of control variables. The addition of a domestic 
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entity as a direct owner does not have a significant impact on performance. However, the 
more concentrated a fund’s management, the lower the performance. Both of these 
variables may indicate a lack of management oversight, an additional layer of protection 
in case of fraud, or the attempt of management to hide the background of certain owners. 
Overall, operational risk, as measured by conflicts of interest and management structure, 
has some negative effect on performance. 
 One strong argument to justify the use of related entities for transactions and 
internal conflicts is that these provide a means to reduce costs. Although affiliates and 
multiple managerial responsibilities for clients may represent potential conflicts of 
interest, when used by ethical managers with good operational risk controls they may 
alternatively represent a benefit to investors. To examine this issue, we split the data into 
problem and nonproblem groups and re-run the model similar to Model 3 in Table VI. 
Style dummies are included to control for style differences and appraisal ratios are 
computed as before. A Chow test reveals that the results reported in Table VII are 
significantly different at the 1% level.37 
    <Insert Table VII about here> 
As a robustness check we examine the extent to which fund characteristics can 
explain the difference between problem fund returns and the returns on a matched sample 
of nonproblem funds. 38 The results are qualitatively similar to the appraisal ratio results. 
The relationship variable is as significant as before, but we alse see that concentrated 
ownership leads to a significant reduction in performance, as does high incentive fees. 39 
 Agency theory also makes predictions about the effect of ownership concentration 
on performance. Here, a simple linear model may be insufficient to capture predicted 
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effects. Having a large shareholder with a significant stake in a publicly traded firm 
provides benefits to smaller shareholders due to coat-tail effects. However, if the 
shareholder is big enough, he or she is able to enjoy all the benefits of control.40 Since 
hedge funds are not organized like public corporations, predictions about the sign of the 
coefficient on ownership concentration are not clear. We might conjecture that having a 
single controlling owner leaves fewer checks on adverse behavior by other owners. On 
the other hand, reputational effects might cause such a major stakeholder to act in 
shareholders’ best interests. As with the literature on the ownership structure of public 
corporations, the ownership structure is endogenously determined. Further, as we find 
above, endogenous factors influencing capital choice are likely to extend to the past 
regulatory and legal problems of the owner, as well as the markets traded and the 
technology developed by the firm. 
 In Table VII, both problem and nonproblem funds react the same way to the 
existence of an owner with more than 75% percent of firm equity, although the 
coefficient is only statistically significant for nonproblem funds. Concentrated ownership 
is related to lower performance for both samples. By sorting on the problem funds, we 
have already presumably proxied on fund management quality, and thus this particular 
variable loses its ability to predict performance with a sample of mostly poor quality 
funds.41 
Taken together, these results provide some evidence that potential conflicts are 
not universally bad. They support the theory that related entities and overlapping services 
have the potential to provide benefits to clients. In other words, lack of constraints may 
be used either for good or ill, depending upon the quality and ethics of the manager. The 
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results further suggest that a simple model of the effects of potential conflicts of interest 
may be insufficient, and that the interaction of these conflicts with legal and regulatory 
problems makes a difference. 
 
D. Observable Proxies for Operational Risk 
 The results in Tables VI and VII indicate ADV proxies for operational risk are 
negatively related to historical performance. They thus represent an important possible 
forecasting variable for investors. Although these variables are not reported in publicly 
available databases prior to 2006, other variables are. Information such as fund style, 
size, age, types of investments and so forth could be obtained from leading data vendors 
such as TASS. In this section, we examine the potential for constructing an instrument for 
operational risk using these observed variables. This allows us to retrospectively examine 
the performance of “problem” funds. In addition, given the most recent court decision 
regarding SEC requirements for hedge fund managers to file Form ADV as part of the 
registration process, the instrument based on TASS or other databases may be a useful 
additional tool going forward with which to assess operational risk. Although many funds 
now have the option to deregister, it remains to be seen how many and what sort of funds 
choose to do so. Finally, the observable instrument allows us to examine the extent to 
which past publicly available information alone might have been able to capture 
operational risk. 
To construct the instrument, we use a matched data set to perform a canonical 
correlation analysis using the Form ADV disclosures in 2006 together with TASS 
variables that have been observed over a number of years.42 We first identify TASS 
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variables that prior research has shown to be associated with the probability of fund 
failure. We then define a linear combination of these variables that maximally correlate 
with the cross-section of Form ADV disclosures in February 2006 that match to the 
TASS sample. This linear combination is our univariate proxy for operational risk, or ω-
score.43 Finally, we use this linear combination to proxy for unobserved Form ADV 
information in the years prior to February 2006 using a time series of TASS fund 
characteristics.  
    <Insert Table VIII about here> 
 Panel A of Table VIII reports the results of the canonical analysis. Average 
monthly returns from the previous year, monthly standard deviation from the previous 
year, size at the beginning of the period, fund age and whether or not the fund reports 
assets are included in the analysis, as these variables have been previously related to fund 
death (Liang (2000), Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) , Getmansky, (2006)). The 
reported asset variable is a binary variable with a value of one if the fund reports assets 
and zero if it does not. Other characteristic data from TASS, which relate to fund quality, 
are also included. 
 The maximal correlation between a linear combination of TASS variables and 
Form ADV variables is 0.42, significant at the 1% level. The Form ADV variables are 
almost all positively correlated with the canonical variable, indicating that a higher value 
has more operational risk.44 Higher returns, standard deviation, and incentive fee are all 
negatively correlated with the TASS canonical variable, indicating that these are 
negatively correlated with operational risk. This canonical variable, a linear combination 
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of observed TASS variables calibrated to the February 2006 ADV disclosures, is our 
univariate proxy for operational risk, or ω-score. 
 From 1994 to 2005, we compute the ω-score each year using the raw coefficients 
from our original analysis on the matched sample.45 We then regress fund returns on this 
operational risk ω-score and include unreported style dummies to control for style 
differences.46 We also control for market risk by estimating market betas for all funds 
each year and include the unreported betas in the yearly cross-sectional regressions. Both 
TASS and cluster-based style dummies are used. We begin in 1994 as TASS began 
keeping defunct funds in their data set that year. Panel B of Table VIII reports the results 
of this analysis. 
 Over the entire 12 year history, both specifications result in a negative ω-score 
coefficient. The ω-score is significant at the 5% level using the Brown and Goetzmann 
(2003) style dummies and is significant at the 10% level using TASS style dummies. 
Hence, just as we find in our limited 1 year cross-sectional sample for 2006, operational 
risk is negatively related to fund returns. Of the 12 years, the operational risk variable is 
negatively related to returns in a majority of the years in both models. The one year in 
which the variable is positive and significant is 1998, which was an extremely difficult 
year for hedge funds due to the Russian debt crisis and the near collapse of LTCM. 
The1998 period is also a year of great attrition of hedge funds, which would eliminate ex-
post some of the riskiest funds in the sample—a selection bias that is known to induce a 
spurious ex-post cross-sectional relationship between risk and returns (see Fung and 
Hsieh (2000, 2002), and Liang (2000)). 
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 In Panel C we consider the extent to which our operational risk ω-score predicts 
leverage. Consistent with results reported in Table IV, the results clearly show that funds 
with high ω-scores constructed from database variables observable at the time are 
correlated with differences in leverage. Further, these differences in leverage are not due 
to fund style differences, defined in various ways.47  
 These results suggest that while it may be difficult to construct a perfect proxy for 
Form ADV conflict variables going forward, in the absence of such filings it is possible 
to construct a univariate measure of operational risk based solely on observable 
characteristics reported in the TASS database.  
 
E. Investor Flows and Operational Risk 
 In the analysis thus far, we find evidence that the operational risk variables in 
Form ADV filings by hedge fund managers are potentially relevant to expectations about 
returns. At the same time, we also find evidence that equity investors and lenders to 
problem funds are able to differentiate them from nonproblem funds. Problem funds are 
more likely to have less average and maximum leverage, and are more likely to have an 
owner with an ownership stake greater than 75%. These results are consistent with the 
redundancy hypothesis, the conjecture that major debt and equity investors have access to 
information that allows them to distinguish between funds on the basis of their operation 
risk component even absent mandated Form ADVdisclosure. Our canonical correlation 
analysis shows one such separating mechanism that relies upon existing (albeit costly) 
hedge fund databases. In this section, we ask whether individual investors are able to 
differentiate between problem and nonproblem funds absent the Form ADV filing 
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information. We have already found some evidence consistent with this ability. Problem 
funds have lower incentive fees, perhaps because they have to compensate for 
reputational issues. A more powerful test of the redundancy hypothesis, however, is to 
check whether investor flows respond equally to good performance by problem and 
nonproblem funds. 
 
<Insert Table IX about here> 
 
 Table IX reports the results of a flow-performance regression applied to the cross-
section of all funds.48 Annual fund flow, defined as the percentage change in assets in a 
given year, net of asset returns and assuming end-of-year investment, is regressed on the 
rank for the fund within style, separated into three segments to allow for High, Middle, 
and Low performance.49 This separation is due to considerable previous evidence in the 
mutual fund sector that the flow-performance relationship is stronger for higher-ranked 
funds. Next we include the operational risk score constructed using the canonical 
correlation analysis, and a set of interaction terms taking the product of the operational 
risk score with the rank. Note that there is no apparent or significant difference between 
the flow-performance relationship and the operational risk score, nor is there a consistent 
pattern in the interaction terms. Operational risk factors do not appear to influence fund 
flow. The fact that investors do not take these factors into account was the motivation 
behind the SEC rule change that mandated disclosure of information material to a 
determination of operational risk. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The hedge fund industry has enjoyed tremendous growth over the past several 
years. This growth led to an in-depth review of hedge fund activities by the SEC, and in 
2004 resulted in the adoption of new rules and rule amendments that greatly expanded the 
number of hedge fund managers required to register with the SEC as investment advisers 
and file Form ADV. The SEC argued that Form ADV disclosure was necessary to 
provide material information to hedge fund investors concerned about operational risk. 
These rule changes were resisted by the hedge fund industry, which argued that the Form 
ADV filing requirement was unnecessarily burdensome given that the information 
disclosed could be obtained in other ways. Shortly after the first filing date in February 
2006, the Federal Courts struck down this filing requirement. 
By matching every Form ADV filed in February 2006 to the TASS hedge fund 
database, we are able to show that these disclosures do indeed contain information that 
can be used to measure operational risk. Legal, regulatory, and other problems are highly 
associated with measures of conflict of interest reported on those forms. However, is this 
information material to investors? To answer this question, we examine the hypothesis 
that the disclosures provided redundant information to equity investors, lenders, and 
share investors in hedge funds. 
We test the redundancy hypothesis in several ways. We examine differences in 
ownership structure and find that problem funds had a higher likelihood of an owner with 
a stake greater than 75%, and more indirect ownership. This is consistent with problem 
funds having less access to equity capital. We next examine differences in leverage. 
Controlling for the effects of style and the issues of retrospective definition of operational 
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risk, we find strong evidence that problem funds and funds with higher operational risk 
tend to have lower average leverage. Since the ownership structures and degree of 
leverage pre-date Form ADV disclosure, we conclude that this disclosure is not material 
to well-informed capital market participants. 
 Finally, we test whether hedge fund investors are able to distinguish between 
problem and nonproblem funds. In contrast to the earlier findings, operational risk 
indicators have no influence on the well-documented flow-performance relationship. This 
suggests that Form ADV disclosures contain information not generally available to 
investors. While registration is not costless, an argument can be made that the 
information disclosed is indeed material to investors and that mandatory disclosure would 
level the informational playing field. However, mandatory disclosure in February 2006 
did not help the investors at Amaranth Advisors LLC, the well-known hedge fund that 
collapsed in September 2006.50 This fund does not appear to have filed Form ADV in 
February. Given that Amaranth was not exempt from the filing requirement, failure to file 
should have been highly informative. We cannot exclude the possibility that the high net 
worth individuals and institutions continued to invest in Amaranth despite knowing all 
that there was to know about this company. In other words, disclosure might meet the 
stated purpose of providing information that allows investors to avoid operational risk. 
However, it might not be material information if investors, having access to this 
information, choose not to act upon it. 
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics of TASS Data 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for funds whose management companies filed Form ADV and are reported on the TASS 
database as of 31 December 2005. The cross-section sample mean and median of these descriptive statistics are compared with those 
of the entire live TASS database as of the same date, together with the difference in sample means and a measure of the significance 
of the difference. Return is the average return over the life of the fund. Autocorrelation is the first order autocorrelation of the fund’s 
returns. Mfee is the management fee, reported in percent. Ifee is the incentive fee, reported in percent. Min. Invt. is the minimum 
investment of the fund and Assets are the assets of the fund in millions of dollars Leverage, Margin and High Water Mark are one if 
the fund uses leverage, uses margin, or has a high water mark, respectively. Lockup Period is measured in months. Sub. Freq. is the 
subscription frequency measured in days and Red. Freq. is the redemption frequency also measured in days. **, * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 
 Matched Funds All TASS Live Funds
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Median Std. Dev. Diff p-value
Return 2282 0.96 0.83 0.79 3998 0.93 0.79 0.88 0.03 0.22
Std. Dev. 2279 2.71 1.99 2.27 3992 2.78 2.06 2.38 -0.07 0.11
Skewness 2270 0.01 -0.05 1.14 3975 0.01 -0.06 1.11 0.00 0.87
Kurtosis 2261 2.62 1.02 6.59 3958 2.57 0.97 6.21 0.05 0.81
Autocorrelation 2240 0.14 0.14 0.20 3919 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.02 0.00**
Sharpe ratio 2279 0.39 0.30 0.72 3992 0.34 0.28 0.59 0.05 0.01*
Mfee 2298 1.38 1.50 0.51 4019 1.44 1.50 0.58 -0.06 0.00**
Ifee 2298 17.13 20.00 6.18 4019 16.27 20.00 6.87 0.86 0.00**
Min. Invt. 2295 1.23 0.50 8.01 4012 3.84 0.40 112.93 -2.61 0.15
Assets 1989 186.64 55.00 427.16 3503 181.11 48.00 439.36 5.53 0.65
Leverage 2298 0.56 1.00 0.50 4019 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.51
Margin 1733 0.46 0.00 0.50 2938 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.02 0.18
High water Mark 2298 0.80 1.00 0.40 4019 0.76 1.00 0.43 0.04 0.00**
Lockup Period 2298 4.36 0.00 6.63 4019 3.55 0.00 7.00 0.81 0.00**
Sub. Freq. 2279 36.02 30.00 25.40 3972 34.43 30.00 25.22 1.59 0.01*
Red. Freq. 2284 83.00 90.00 85.88 4001 69.21 30.00 75.76 13.79 0.00**
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Table II 
Comparison of Problem and Nonproblem Funds 
 
This table reports cross-sectional means, medians and the difference in means of 
descriptive statistics for both Problem and Nonproblem funds in our population of hedge 
funds filing Form ADV. Problem funds are any TASS fund whose management company 
answered “Yes” to any of the questions on Item 11 of Form ADV. Nonproblem funds are 
all other TASS funds that filed Form ADV. Panel A reports results for performance 
statistics. Avg Return, Std Dev, 1st Order AC, Sharpe ratio, and Appraisal Ratio are the 
average return of the fund, the standard deviation, the first-order autocorrelation, Sharpe 
ratio, and appraisal ratio of the fund over its life. Panel B reports results for external 
conflicts of interest, while Panel C breaks down internal conflict data. Broker/Dealer is 
one if the fund has a related broker/dealer. Investment Comp is one if the fund has a 
related investment company. Investment Adviser, Commodities Broker, Bank, Insurance 
and Sponsor of LLP are one if the fund is related to one of these respective companies. 
BuySellYourOwn is one if the company buys and sells between itself and clients. 
BuySellYourselfClients is one if a related party buys and sells securities also 
recommended to the fund. RecSecYouOwn is one if the fund recommends securities in 
which a related party has an ownership interest. AgencyCrossTrans is one if the fund 
performs agency cross-transactions. RecUnderwriter is one if a related party recommends 
securities to clients for which they are the underwriter. RecSalesInterest is one if a related 
party recommends securities with a sales interest. OtherResearch is one if the fund uses 
external research. Panel D looks at fund/manager characteristics and 
governance/ownership variables, respectively. High Water Mark, Leveraged, and Margin 
are one if the fund has a high water mark, uses leverage, or uses margin. Direct Owners 
represents the number of direct owners. Controlling is the number of controlling owners. 
75% ownership is the percentage of owners who own at least 75% of the fund. Domestic 
Direct Corp gives the number of domestic corporations listed as direct owners. Indirect 
Owners represents the number of indirect owners. **, * indicate significance at the 1% 
and 5% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Performance Statistics and Fund/Manager Characteristics 
 
 Problem Funds Nonproblem Funds   
 N Mean Median N Mean Median Diff p-value
Avg Return 310 0.77 0.68 1603 0.91 0.79 -0.14 0.00**
Std Dev 308 2.50 1.66 1568 2.71 2.02 -0.21 0.15
1st order AC 283 0.12 0.14 1441 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.60
Sharpe ratio 308 0.28 0.25 1568 0.36 0.26 -0.08 0.01*
Appraisal Ratio 303 -0.02 0.03 1548 0.06 0.05 -0.08 0.02**
AUM ($mm) 334 217.32 59.18 1653 179.96 54.00 37.36 0.20
Age (Years) 367 5.60 4.50 1929 4.96 3.83 0.64 0.01**
Min Investment ($mm) 367 0.96 0.50 1926 1.28 0.50 -0.32 0.33
Management Fee (%) 367 1.37 1.50 1929 1.38 1.50 -0.01 0.71
Incentive Fee (%) 367 15.25 20.00 1929 17.49 20.00 -2.24 0.00**
High Water Mark 367 0.69 1.00 1929 0.82 1.00 -0.13 0.00**
Lockup Period (months) 367 4.00 0.00 1929 4.43 0.00 -0.43 0.21
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Panel B: External Conflicting Relationships 
 
 Problem Funds Nonproblem Funds   
With: N % Yes N % Yes Diff p-value
Broker/Dealer 368 73.1 1929 23.7 49.4 0.00**
Investment Comp 368 50.3 1929 15.8 34.5 0.00**
Investment Adviser 368 73.9 1929 41.6 32.3 0.00**
Commodities Broker 368 53.5 1929 20.7 32.8 0.00**
Bank 368 40.5 1929 9.8 30.7 0.00**
Insurance 368 39.9 1929 8.3 31.6 0.00**
Sponsor of LLP 368 56.8 1929 21.5 35.3 0.00**
 
Panel C: Internal Conflicts 
 
 Problem Funds Nonproblem Funds   
 N % Yes N % Yes Diff p-value
BuySellYourOwn 368 30.7 1929 8.3 22.4 0.00**
BuySellYourselfClients 368 84.8 1929 69.3 15.5 0.00**
RecSecYouOwn 368 75.5 1929 50.4 25.1 0.00**
AgencyCrossTrans 368 30.7 1929 2.3 28.4 0.00**
RecUnderwriter 368 69.0 1929 47.0 22.0 0.00**
RecSalesInterest 368 22.6 1929 15.7 6.9 0.00**
RecBrokers 368 46.7 1929 38.0 8.7 0.00**
OtherResearch 368 81.0 1929 70.5 10.5 0.00**
 
Panel D: Ownership/Capital Structure 
 
 Problem Funds Nonproblem Funds   
 N Mean Median N Mean Median Diff p-value
Direct Owners 368 9.96 9.00 1929 7.33 6.00 2.63 0.00**
Controlling 368 8.28 7.00 1929 5.97 5.00 2.31 0.00**
75% ownership  366 0.73 1.00 1929 0.50 0.50 0.23 0.00**
Domestic Direct Corp 368 0.80 1.00 1929 0.49 0.00 0.31 0.00**
Indirect Owners 368 2.33 1.00 1929 1.37 0.00 0.96 0.00**
Leveraged 367 0.51 1.00 1929 0.57 1.00 -0.06 0.03*
Margin 280 0.35 0.00 1451 0.49 0.00 -0.14 0.00**
Personal Capital ($mm) 109 1.26 0.00 622 2.62 0.00 -1.36 0.02*
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Table III 
Probit Model Analysis on the “Problem” Variable 
 
Probit results are reported in this table. The dependent variable in all models is one if the 
fund has a problem, and zero if the fund does not have a problem. The model is modeled 
such that the results aim to fit the “problem” set of data (i.e., 1). Log(Assets) is the log of 
the assets under management in dollars. High Water Mark is one if the fund has a high 
water mark. Mean Return is the average return over the life of the fund. Incentive Fee is 
the fund’s incentive fee in percent. Relationship is one if the fund has any external 
conflict of interest listed in Table II. AgencyCrossTrans is one if the fund performs 
agency cross transactions. RecSecYouOwn is one if the fund recommends securities in 
which a related party has an ownership interest. BuySellYourOwn is one if the company 
buys and sells between itself and clients. OtherResearch is one if the fund uses external 
research. 75% ownership is the percentage of direct owners who own at least 75% of the 
company. Direct Domestic is the number of domestic corporations listed as direct 
owners. Unreported style dummies are included to control for style differences. **, * 
indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coefficient Chi-Sq coefficient Chi-Sq coefficient Chi-Sq
Log(Assets) 0.014 0.49 -0.022 1.08 -0.007 0.00
High Water Mark -0.199 5.36* -0.114 1.49 -0.149 2.31
Mean Return 0.059 1.23
Incentive Fee -0.037 21.44** -0.038 20.29** -0.036 16.82**
Relationship   0.759 66.17** 0.652 44.44**
AgencyCrossTrans   1.400 121.65**
RecSecYouOwn   0.345 17.70** 0.374 19.32**
BuySellYourOwn   0.695 49.38**
OtherResearch   0.294 8.43** 0.226 4.53*
75% ownership    0.551 38.15**
Direct Domestic   0.134 9.60**
   
   
Pseudo R2 3.89% 16.59% 25.30%
Num. Obs. 1,986 1,986 1,969
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Table IV 
Problems and Leverage 
 
This table reports the results of several tests of the relationship between fund leverage 
and measures of operational risk. This table reports tests for mean differences in three 
leverage measures between problem and nonproblem funds. The three measures are 
Leveraged, which is a zero-one variable reported by TASS, Avg. Leverage, the average 
fund leverage reported by TASS, Maximum Leverage the maximum leverage of the fund 
reported by TASS. The test is applied to all funds in the match sample, then to a subset 
that excludes funds-of-funds, and finally to a set for which the top 5% in terms of 
leverage are winsorized. **, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Problem Funds Nonproblem Funds  
 N Mean N Mean Diff p-value
All Funds in Matched Sample 
Leveraged 367 0.51 1,929 0.57 -0.06 0.03**
Avg.Leverage 280 52.20 1,451 85.31 -33.11 0.00**
Maximum Leverage 280 96.82 1,451 140.68 -43.86 0.00**
 Only Hedge Funds 
Leveraged 271 0.61 1,535 0.61 0.00 0.87
Avg. Leverage 225 63.73 1,201 95.57 -31.84 0.01**
Maximum Leverage 225 118.27 1,201 158.80 -40.53 0.04*
 All Funds in Matched Sample - Winsorized Top 5% 
Avg. Leverage 280 43.34 1,451 65.15 -21.81 0.00**
Maximum Leverage 280 81.46 1,451 108.33 -26.87 0.00**
 
 39
Table V 
Fund Distribution and Leverage by Style 
 
This table reports the breakdown of matches and leverage by style. The first two columns 
report the percentage of funds in each style for both the entire matched ADV sample and 
the problem group. The third column reports the average leverage for problem funds in 
each style while the last column reports the average leverage for nonproblem funds in 
each style. 
 
Category Matched Problem Problem Avg. Nonproblem Avg.
Convertible Arbitrage 4.22% 7.07% 118.04 170.24
Dedicated Short 0.70% 0.00% n/a 72.22
Emerging Markets 4.22% 2.99% 0.00 18.60
Equity Neutral 6.26% 5.71% 185.31 61.18
Event Driven 11.92% 13.59% 51.30 51.37
Fixed Inc. Arbitrage 6.05% 3.26% 287.50 415.89
Fund of Funds 21.31% 26.09% 6.47 36.04
Global Macro 3.57% 0.81% 140.00 134.24
Long-Short Equity 34.71% 32.61% 23.85 44.91
Managed Futures 3.48% 4.08% 19.34 91.01
Multi-Strategy 3.52% 3.53% 40.00 120.70
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Table VI 
Conflicts, Ownership, and Fund Returns 
 
This table reports results estimating the equation  
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using the clustering Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) approach of Liang and 
Zeger (1986) to account for correlations of the residual iε of funds within the same fund 
management company. Appraisal ratios are calculated with monthly fund returns with 
respect to funds’ respective style indices and U.S. Treasury Bill returns. LogAssets is the 
log of the assets under management in dollars. Std Dev is the standard deviation of a 
fund’s returns over the life of the fund. Onshore is one if the fund is based in the United 
States. Incentive fee is the fund’s incentive fee in percent. High Water Mark is one if the 
fund has a high water mark. Relationship is one if the fund has any external conflicts of 
interest. Direct Domestic is the number of domestic corporations listed as direct owners. 
75% ownership is the percentage of direct owners who own at least 75% of the company. 
Unreported style dummies were included to control for style differences. Results are 
reported with the first 18 months of returns removed to control for backfill bias and 
clustered standard errors to control for non-independent management company returns. 
The top and bottom 1% of appraisal ratios are winsorized to control for outliers. **, * 
indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Log(Assets) 0.061 6.12** 0.061 6.03** 0.060 6.02**
Std Dev -0.027 -3.84** -0.029 -4.18** -0.029 -4.18**
Onshore 0.086 3.19** 0.089 2.90** 0.091 3.41**
Lockup Period 0.002 0.74
Incentive Fee  0.008 3.23** 0.008 3.12**
High Water Mark  -0.109 -3.38** -0.103 -3.17**
Relationship  -0.008 -0.23 -0.001 -0.02
Direct Domestic  -0.027 -1.27
75% ownership   -0.078 -2.47*
  
  
Pseudo R2 5.57% 6.16% 6.51%
Number of 
observations 
1,642 1,642 1,642
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Table VII 
Conflicts, Ownership, and Returns: Problem vs. Nonproblem Funds 
 
This table reports GEE estimation results using fund appraisal ratios as the dependent variable, and alternatively, returns on 
problem funds in excess of returns on a sample of nonproblem funds matched by style, size, age and return standard deviation. 
Appraisal ratios are calculated with monthly fund returns with respect to funds’ respective style indices and U.S. Treasury Bill 
returns. Log (Assets) is the log of the assets under management in dollars. Std Dev is the standard deviation of a fund’s returns 
over the life of the fund. Onshore is one if the fund is based in the United States. Incentive fee is the fund’s incentive fee in 
percent. High Water Mark is one if the fund has a high water mark. Relationship is one if the fund has any external conflicts of 
interest. Direct Domestic is the number of domestic corporations listed as direct owners. 75% ownership is the percentage of 
direct owners who own at least 75% of the company. Unreported style dummies were included to control for style differences. 
Results are reported with the first 18 months of returns removed to control for backfill bias and clustered standard errors to 
control for non-independent management company returns. The top and bottom 1% of appraisal ratios are winsorized to 
control for outliers. **, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Problem Fund
Appraisal Ratios 
 Nonproblem Fund        
Appraisal Ratios 
 Problem Fund                
Matched Sample Returns 
 coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
Log(Assets) 0.073 4.17 ** 0.047 4.19 ** 0.011 0.33
Fund Age (Years) 0.009 1.31 0.016 3.57 ** -0.014 -0.93
Std Dev -0.018 -1.21 -0.040 -4.73 ** 0.010 0.31
Onshore 0.120 1.80 0.061 2.14 * 0.151 1.74
Incentive Fee 0.003 0.44 0.009 3.38 ** -0.023 -2.09 *
High Water Mark -0.018 -0.25 -0.056 -1.56  -0.123 -1.31
Relationship -0.251 -2.53 * 0.023 0.58  -0.426 -2.18 *
Direct Domestic 0.026 0.52 -0.027 -1.18  -0.049 -0.70
Percent own 75% -0.081 -1.56 -0.075 -2.15 * -0.264 -2.37 *
   
R2 18.02% 6.76% 7.08%
Num Obs. 273 1,369 279
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Table VIII 
Canonical and Time Series Analysis of TASS and ADV Data 
This table reports the results of a canonical analysis relating operational risk ADV data to the 
observable TASS data. Panel A reports the results of the canonical analysis using 2,279 matched 
funds used to construct a univariate measure of operational risk, or ω-score, using the linear 
combination implied by the TASS canonical variate. In Panel B we report regression results 
regressing annual fund return from 1994 to 2005 on the ω-score updated each year using 
information in that year’s TASS database on the basis of nine successive annual TASS data sets. 
Previous Returns are the average monthly returns from the previous year and Previous Std. Dev. 
is the monthly standard deviation from the previous year. Age and Size are the values from the end 
of the previous period. Other characteristic data are from the same period as the analysis. Reports 
Assets is a binary variable with a value of one if the fund reports assets and zero if it does not. 
Unreported style dummies and market betas were included in Panel B. The average number of 
observations is the average number of funds included in each year’s cross section regression of 
fund returns against operational risk characteristic and style. Panel C shows the extent to which 
this measure of operational risk predicts leverage. The dependent variable in each regression is the 
average leverage of each fund as reported by TASS. The independent variable is that year’s 
operational risk ω-score. Unreported style dummies, as defined by TASS, and style dummies 
using the Brown-Goetzmann style classification procedure are included to control for style 
differences. **, * indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Canonical Correlation Results 
TASS Variables ADV Variables   
Previous Returns -0.27** AgencyCrossTrans 0.06* 
Previous Std. Dev. -0.35** RelBrokerDealer 0.28** 
Fund Age -0.07** RelInvestComp 0.24** 
Log of Assets 0.13** RelInvAdviser 0.24** 
Reports Assets 0.12** RelCommod 0.44** 
Incentive Fee -0.88** RelBank 0.38** 
Margin -0.29** RelInsur 0.44** 
Audited -0.19** RelPartSponser 0.30** 
Personal Capital -0.29** BuySellYourOwn 0.08* 
Onshore -0.05** BuySellYourselfClient -0.08** 
Open to Inv. 0.08 RecSecYouOwn 0.33** 
Accepts Managed Accts -0.13** RecUnderwriter 0.26** 
 RecSalesInterest 0.28** 
 RecBrokers -0.33** 
 OtherResearch -0.70** 
Correlation Between  75% ownership 0.15** 
 TASS and ADV Panels 0.42** DirectDomestic 0.31** 
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Table VIII-Continued 
 
 
Panel B: Operational Risk Measure Predicting Returns 
 TASS Style Dummies B-G Style Dummies
Year coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
1994 -3.72% -3.36** -2.28% -2.20*
1995 0.20% 0.21 0.10% 0.12
1996 -1.97% -2.38* -3.27% -4.76**
1997 -2.96% -3.49** -2.61% -3.71**
1998 2.84% 3.23** 0.42% 0.60
1999 -1.99% -1.64 -0.13% -0.14
2000 0.19% 0.21 -0.18% -0.25
2001 -0.96% -1.57 -0.42% -0.95
2002 -2.61% -5.88** -1.48% -4.43**
2003 0.25% 0.48 -0.41% -1.12
2004 -1.08% -2.88** -0.67% -2.45*
2005 0.06% 0.14 -0.11% -1.31
Average Value -0.98% -1.87 -0.92% -2.66*
Average Adjusted-R2 21.95% 40.17% 
Average Number of Observations 1,027   1,027   
 
Panel C: Operational Risk Measure Predicting Leverage 
 TASS Style Dummies B-G Style Dummies
Year coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
2001 -22.87 -4.17**  -28.07  -5.48**
2002 -18.45 -3.50**  -27.52  -5.81**
2003 -25.33 -4.90**  -33.52  -7.23**
2004 -29.12 -5.92**  -35.08  -8.26**
2005 -18.48 -4.17 **  -6.42  -6.83**
Average Value -22.85 -11.15 ** -26.12 -5.08**
Average Adjusted-R2 13.79% 2.66% 
Average Number of Observations 2,279 2,279   
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Table IX 
Operational Risk and Flow Analysis 
 
Table IX reports results estimating the fund flow equation  
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cross-sectionally using data for each year from 1994 to2005. Flows are computed 
annually using the following formula: 
 
 1  
1
( - )= it it itit
it
Assets Assets ReturnFlow
Assets
−
−
× . 
 
Assets and returns are computed in the fund’s native currency to avoid exchange rate 
affects. Low Rank, Mid Rank, and High Rank are computed as Min(Rankt-1,0), 
Min(Rankt-1 – Low Rank, 0), and Min(Rankt-1 – Mid Rank – Low Rank, 0), respectively, 
where Rankt-1 is the percentile level of the previous year’s performance in the fund’s 
TASS style. Std Dev is the previous year’s monthly standard deviation. CategoryFlow is 
the average flow to that fund’s particular style in year t. LogAssets is the log of the 
previous end of period’s assets and ManagementFee is the current management fee level. 
The operational risk ω-score measure is computed each year as in Table VIII. Model 1 
includes the operational risk ω-score only, whereas Model 2 also includes three 
interaction terms. Both models are run using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) framework. 
Standard errors are computed using Newey-West (1987) with one lag. **, * indicate 
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
LowRank 0.596 6.10** 0.634 7.30**
MidRank 0.977 6.89** 0.981 6.79**
HighRank 0.905 11.69** 0.886 7.39**
Std Dev of monthly returns -0.022 -5.44** -0.023 -5.79**
CategoryFlows 0.685 9.80** 0.686 9.63**
LogAssets -0.117 -6.45** -0.118 -6.52**
ManagementFees -0.045 -3.06* -0.044 -2.89*
Operational Risk ω-score -0.010 -1.61 0.025 1.02
Low Rank/ ω-score interaction -0.019 -0.15
Mid Rank/ ω-score interaction -0.202 -1.78
High Rank/ ω-score interaction 0.085 0.62
  
Adjusted-R2 14.00% 14.16%  
Number of Observations 966 966  
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Footnotes 
1 According to Lipper TASS Inc., hedge fund assets under management have doubled 
over the last five years to over $1 trillion in December 2005. 
2 These quotations and further discussion can be found in the SEC proposed rules 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm. 
3 This model has been developed to explain the premium awarded to foreign firms that 
choose to register in the United States and submit themselves to stringent SEC disclosure 
requirements (see Cantale (1996), Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz(2004), Fuerst(1998) and 
Moel(1999)). 
4 Interestingly enough, we could not find a filing in February for Amaranth Advisors 
LLC, which failed in September. We believe they claimed exemption because they had 
fewer than 15 investors. This might be a case in which failure to file would have been 
highly informative to the investors in funds managed by Amaranth.  
5 The 2 year lockup period provision is included for the purpose of excluding venture 
capital and private equity firm managers from the filing requirement; however, hedge 
fund managers have been lengthening their lockups to two years to avoid the filing 
requirement.  
See http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_52/b3914039_mz011.htm. 
6 http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm. 
7 These limited hedge fund filings have already been used by academic researchers; 
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) use these filings to analyze the actions of hedge funds 
during the technology bubble. 
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8 According the Phil Goldstein, the hedge fund manager who successfully challenged the 
requirement in court, Form ADV “asked for everything from ‘your last small-pox 
vaccination to every dirty joke you got on E-mail’” (Wall Street Journal June 28, 2006). 
Though this may be something of an exaggeration, the SEC estimated in advance of the 
rule changes that registration would cost around $45,000, and this does not account for 
the requirement to hire compliance officers, who command between $200,000 and 
$750,000 (Wall Street Journal June 8, 2005), or the costs associated with purchasing 
software to better monitor trading, establishing policies governing their practices, and 
filing the required forms with the SEC. This cost would disproportionately affect smaller 
funds. 
9 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERS, Report of the 
Operational Risk Committee: Evaluating Operational Risk Controls, CONCLUSIONS 
AND FINDINGS ON THE TOPIC OF: “How should firms determine the effectiveness 
of their operational risk controls?” November 2001, www.iafe.org.  
10 The management failures associated with the rogue trading losses at National Australia 
Bank are well documented (APRA(2004), PWC(2004). Allied Irish Bank experienced a 
loss of almost $700 million due to trading losses by one trader. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AIB_Group. In January 2008 Société Générale lost 
approximately €4.9 billion closing out positions incurred by a rogue trader. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_2008_Soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9_G%C3%A9n%C3
%A9rale_trading_loss_incident . 
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11 See, for example, http://capco.com/alternative_investment.html. However, this 
observation needs to be qualified. A firm in financial distress due to unfortunate 
investment outcomes might be more likely to cut corners on compliance and experience 
an operational risk event. We thank Michael Triguboff for this observation. 
12 Despite being difficult to quantitatively assess, there is ample evidence that operational 
risk is considered important in the financial marketplace. Fontnouvelle (2003, 2006) find 
that operational losses for banks are large and significant. In fact, the authors find the 
capital charge for operational risk is often larger than the charge for market risk. 
Lantsman and Lewis (2005) study the use of unauthorized trading insurance. They find 
banks and insurance companies value unauthorized trading differently, which has caused 
a slow adoption of this operational risk insurance product. 
13 See http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/IapdMain/iapd_SiteMap.aspx, the 
SEC investment advisor website. 
14 There are additional forms if the company has a “problem” as defined later in the paper 
or if the company also filed with a state agency. 
15 In some cases, the amount of information included on the DRP form was limited. 
16 Data are downloaded in March and April 2006. It is important to note the ADVs are 
dynamic in that the SEC will update the information on the investment advisor website as 
soon as new information is available. Thus, the data downloaded subsequent to April 
2006 will not match exactly the data used in this study. 
17 A few of the funds also listed an investment advisor with a different name than the 
management company. We also include these companies in our search if the management 
company was not located. 
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18 We do not explicitly keep track of this breakdown, but estimate that fewer than 15% of 
all matches are made using the fund name. 
19 Some of the ADV filings do not list any funds. In these cases, the name and address of 
the ADV are used to verify a match. 
20 As of the beginning of April 2006, we are unable to match around 100 management 
companies in TASS with U.S. addresses and over $25 million in assets. There are a 
variety of reasons for these companies not to be registered, including a lockup period 
change, a reduction in assets, or an error in the TASS database. 
21 See, for example, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004). Three liquidity measures—
lockup period, subscription frequency period, and redemption frequency period—are all 
significantly longer for the matched funds, which may be due to more of the matched 
funds being onshore, as onshore funds have more share restrictions. 
22 These results are also run excluding fund-of-funds as their structure is different than 
hedge funds. There are no material differences between these results and the reported 
results. 
23 These data were compiled by the company on March 17, 2006. 
24 Liang (2003) indicates that small funds are more likely to suffer auditing problems. 
The sample here does not include funds with less than $25 million in assets. Hence, 
14.3% could be an underestimate for hedge funds. Another caveat to this conclusion is 
that management companies with associated mutual funds might have a longer history of 
regularity scrutiny, which might lead to a higher incidence of violations and lawsuits. To 
examine that hypothesis we remove all funds with managers that have associated mutual 
fund companies and recalculate Table II. The results are unchanged. 
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25 Appraisal ratios are calculated by first regressing fund i’s excess return on the fund’s 
TASS style index I excess return,  
( ) ,it ft i i It ft itr R r R i Iα β ε− = + − + ∈  where ftR is the coincident U.S. Treasury Bill 
return. The appraisal ratio is then given as the estimate of iα  in that regression divided by 
the residual standard deviation. We remove the first 18 months of returns to control for 
backfill bias and the top and bottom 1% of appraisal ratios are winsorized to control for 
outliers. We obtain similar results using S&P500 index returns in place of TASS style 
index returns.  
26 Both the Sharpe ratio and alpha measures are misspecified and subject to manipulation 
given the non-linear payoffs commonly associated with hedge fund investment strategies 
(Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2004)). Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and 
Ross (1992) argue that the appraisal ratio provides a measure of performance reasonably 
robust to the lookback bias frequently encountered when ranking managers by 
performance, and Agarwal and Naik (2000) further argue that this measure is particularly 
relevant for hedge funds given that it accounts for differences in leverage across funds. 
27 There is a high correlation between all of the conflict of interest variables. 
28 These and later terms refer to checkboxes on Form ADV. For complete definitions of 
these terms and explanations see the SEC website 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf . 
29 The definition of a controlling owner is set by the SEC. This is not a flag set by the 
company itself. 
30 See, for example, Morgan (2004), who argues that individuals anticipating an unfair 
distribution mechanism in the case that the partnership dissolves may be reluctant to enter 
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into the partnership in the first place. This would imply concentration of management 
when agency costs are extreme. This is an issue particularly in emerging economies. See 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) and Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004). 
31 One potential selection bias in the sample of Form ADV filers is that managers might 
have been sued simply because their funds had low returns. To examine this possibility, 
we tested whether the returns to firms in the fourth category (i.e., civil lawsuits) have 
significantly lower returns than the overall group of problem funds. They do not. 
32 See, for example, Morgan (2004). The problem of the fair division of an ongoing 
concern is one of the oldest problems in finance. Sylla (2003) quotes a translation of 
Huygens’ “On Reckoning in Games and Luck.” The quote is an apt one for hedge funds: 
“Since Gaming is becoming a Trade, I think it fit the Adventurers should be upon the 
Square.” 
33 We perform a number of additional robustness checks. First, we considered whether 
more recent legal and regulatory problems are more relevant than older ones. We find 
this to be the case; the correlation between conflicts of interest and legal and regulatory 
problems is lower for funds with problems that occurred before 2002. We checked to see 
if extreme returns are driving results by Winsorizing the top and bottom 1% of returns. 
Results again are unaffected. 
34 These results are not driven by one category. Out of 10 style categories, problem funds 
have lower leverage in seven, approximately the same leverage in two, and higher 
leverage in only one. See Table V. 
35 This procedure, referred to as clustering Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE), is 
described in Liang and Zeger (1986).  
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36Since we find that legal and regulatory problems are associated with leverage, we added 
average leverage to the regressions. The effect is insignificant and does not affect any 
results. We do not report these results in Tables VI and VII. 
37 To examine whether the reported results are an artifact of periods, styles, or length of 
return history, we also consider style mean adjusted returns and a variety of dummies 
controlling for both style and seasoning, as well as for individual year effects. The 
(unreported) results from this analysis are almost identical to the results reported in 
Tables VI and VII. 
38 Problem funds are matched by style, size, age, and risk. For every problem fund, we 
reduce the potential matches to only those nonproblem funds that are within the same 
style. To match in size, age and risk, we next calculate a distance between that fund and 
all the potential matching candidates in three dimensions. To ensure that size, age, and 
risk are treated equally in terms of the matching score, they are standardized by the 
standard deviation of fund values within that style. The nearest fund in this space is the 
closest match. We also match standardizing on the range of the characteristics and with 
matching portfolios. The results are similar to those reported. 
39 The slight change in observation count is due to the use of returns instead of appraisal 
ratios. Matching to the appraisal ratio sample has no affect on the results. 
40 For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Holderness, Krosner, and Sheehan 
(1999) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find evidence of a non-linear relationship 
between percentage of insider ownership and Tobin’s Q. Firm ownership structure is, of 
course, determined endogenously. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) test for ownership effects on performance and find none, a result 
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consistent with endogenous capital structure determination. The latter provides a useful 
summary of related studies. 
41 The problem versus nonproblem distinction is at the fund advisor level. Therefore, it is 
possible that not all of the funds for one particular management company are in the 
problem group. This should not systematically bias our results going forward. However, 
we also examine two subsets of our data to control for this issue. The first subset is 
management companies with five or fewer funds in TASS, and the second is management 
companies with three or fewer funds. The funds in these management companies would 
most likely have higher correlations in terms of personnel, and hence, it is more likely all 
funds would be problem funds. The results are consistent with those reported in the text, 
although the significance levels drop as a substantial portion of our sample is removed. 
42 This canonical correlation procedure was first proposed by Hotelling (1936). A good 
textbook treatment can be found in Press (1972). For another finance application, see 
Brown et al. (2002). 
43 Altman (1968) creates a related z-score model to study credit scoring. 
44 The magnitudes of these correlations are moderate, however. 
45 Instead of assuming the TASS characteristic data are static over time, we utilize nine 
different TASS data sets over a period of nine years to use the most accurate 
characteristic data related to each fund at each time period. We use returns from the most 
recent TASS data set, however, as they are the most complete and accurate. To control 
for backfill bias, we remove the first 18 months of returns for each fund. 
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46 Alternative specifications of the canonical analysis are performed, including adjusted 
returns. These alternative specifications do not change the relationship between 
operational risk and returns. 
47 The difference in sample size between Panel B and Panel C is due to the fact that 
average leverage is reported in the TASS database only starting in 2001. Prior to 2001, 
the data from TASS in the average leverage field was not standardized. Thus, we are only 
able to run the analysis for five years. This explains the later start year for Panel C (and 
the resulting increase in average number of funds considered). The style classification 
developed in Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and applied to hedge funds in Brown and 
Goetzmann (2003) is likely to err on the conservative side by attributing more leverage 
effects to style than economically justified. To the extent that higher leveraged funds 
within a style move more together, this classification will potentially group them as an 
independent cohort. The advantage is that this approach relies on returns and thus is not 
biased by any systematic misreporting of style. 
48 See, for example, Sirri and Tufano (1998) or Chevalier and Ellison (1999), who apply 
this to mutual funds. Agarwal (2006) and Ding (2006) apply this to hedge funds. 
49 The results are robust for this specification of performance. We re-ran the analysis 
splitting the ranks into four and five groups without any appreciable difference in the 
results reported in Table IX. Baquero and Verbeek (2006) make the interesting point that 
lock-up provisions obscure the flow-performance relationship for fund outflows. This is 
particularly an issue in their study as they are dealing with quarterly flows. According to 
Lipper TASS, half of the funds they survey in 2007 report that they either maintain a 
lockup of one quarter or more or assess a significant penalty of between 2% to 3% for 
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withdrawals before the four-month anniversary of new investment. One would not expect 
much of a flow outflow on a quarterly basis and it is for this reason that Table IX 
considers only annual flows. Fund inflows are not subject to lockup provisions, and when 
we use the Heckman (1979) procedure to estimate the model considering only positive 
fund flows, we find that the flow performance relationship is stronger and the influence 
of operational risk is, if anything, weakened. Therefore, the results in Table IX are not an 
artifact of the lockup provision. We also perform this analysis using the problem dummy 
and relationship dummy. Although this sample suffers from survivorship bias, the results 
are similar to the ω-score results we report in Table IX. 
50 The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2006. 
